In this paper, we exploit a major reform of the legal rules of corporate governance to test for the incentive character of managerial contracts.
Introduction
One of the …rst and probably best known applications of principal-agent theory is incentive contracts for managers of publicly owned companies. From theory, managers should be paid according to …rm-performance. Yet, the empirical support for this is rather weak. In their seminal article Jensen and Murphy (1990) …nd that compensation of CEOs increases only by 3.25$ per 1000$ increase in shareholders' wealth. 1 Given Jensen and Murphy's results the question arises whether the pay-performance sensitivity was always that low or if it has changed over time. And if the sensitivity has changed due to an evolving institutional environment, this gives additional insight on the incentive problems within the …rm. We address this issue by analyzing the impact of a large corporate governance reform-the 1884 German joint stock companies act-on the pay-performance relationship within the German banking sector.
This act strictly separated control rights between the supervisory and the executive board of a company and still builds the backbone of the modern German corporate governance code. As the reform aimed at solving problems of corporate control, we can expect moral hazard be of lesser importance in the period after 1884 and the pay-performance link to be much lower. Indeed, we …nd the pay-performance link to be 50% smaller in the post-reform period. Conversely, the lower post-reform pay-performance sensitivity serves as evidence for incentive-contracts before the reform, i.e. the reform itself is a natural experiment. 1 Hall and Liebman (1998) …nd a larger sensitivity for a more recent period. Zhou (2000) analyses Canadian data and Kato (1997) analyses Japanese data. Both report sensitivities that are somewhat larger than what Jensen and Murphy report. Core et al. (2003) give a review of the recent literature on stock-based Executive Compensation and incentives. Murphy (1999) gives an excellent and very general review of the literature concerning incentive related pay for managers and John and Qian (2003) review the CEO-compensation literature with special focus on the banking industry. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) give a general survey of the literature on corporate governance.
As we will analyse German data, one may wonder if for modern German data the sensitivity of pay to performance is much di¤erent to the one for the US. Indeed, the dependency of managerial salaries on pro…ts is also reported to be rather weak for Germany (See e.g. Schwalbach and Graßho¤, 1997 , or Kraft and Niederprüm, 1999a and 1999b . For the period analysed, contemporaries criticised the high salaries of managers and the low dependency of manager-salaries on performance (Warschauer 1902). It is essential to exploit inter-…rm or inter-time di¤erences in pay-performance sensitivities. Only if these di¤erences are linked to changes respectively to di¤er-ences in the institutional or market environment one can obtain a causal interpretation of the pay-performance relationship itself. Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) or Grossmann (2003) for example argue that general-equilibrium e¤ects already induce some correlation between performance and pay even without any strategic considerations when able managers are scarce. Alternatively, Lazaer (2003) explains the pay-performance sensitivity as a selection device.
One way to empirically asses the importance of incentive reasons for a payperformance sensitivity, i.e. to test the principal-agent model, is the use of the volatility of …rm returns. The higher this volatility, the higher the salarybased pay-performance sensitivity should be. Empirical evidence for this is mixed. Aggarwal and Samwick's (1999) results are supportive for the principal agent theory, whereas Garen (1994) and Lambert and Larker (1987) do not …nd strongly signi…cant di¤erences between high-volatility and low-volatility …rms.
One reason for this might be the use of short panels. Managerial contracts are typically multi-period and involve reputation and therefore the dynamic structure of the data is of importance. Simply using …xed-or random-e¤ects OLS estimators might lead to biased results. Using historical data allows us to employ a panel that is long in time dimension. We explicitly take into account the below unit-root autoregressive nature of manager compensation and use the GMM-estimator of Arrellano and Bond (1991) .
As the legal system de…nes the deep parameters that are embedded in the optimal contracts of managers, large changes in the corporate governance code can be used as a test. Large changes in the corporate control code are naturally rare. However, we have a unique data-set that contains accounting data of 9 large German banks covering the period from 1871 to 1910; a period in which the joint-stock company act of 1884 falls. This act is arguably one of the most fundamental reforms the German corporate governance code has undergone so far. Especially, we can expect a legal change in corporate governance to in ‡uence the sensitivity of pay with respect to …rm-performance. And-as said before-we …nd this sensitivity to be substantially in ‡uenced by the legal reform analyzed.
A similar approach has been implemented by Conyon (1997) . He analyzes the impact of voluntary changes in corporate governance on the level of CEO compensation for a sample of UK …rms. His results suggest a rather weak in ‡u-ence of these corporate governance innovations on compensation. In contrast, Core et al. (1999) …nd a substantial in ‡uence of corporate governance on the compensation-level. Additionally, they show that weaker corporate governance not only increases the level of compensation, but also decreases future …rm performance.
The remainder of this paper is now organized as follows. In section 2, we motivate our identi…cation strategy with a highly stylized model of an incentive contract. Moreover, we describe the major legal-institutional shifts of the 1884 legal-reform of the corporate governance code. Section 3 describes the data set, and section 4 presents the estimation model and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical and historical preconsiderations

Incentive contracts
To formalize the basic idea of this paper in a very stylized way, suppose a …rm generates pro…ts employing a manager. This manager derives utility from her salary, w, which may depend on the pro…ts she reports to the owner of the …rm.
Additionally, the manager can divert …rm resources s; which are drawn from …rm pro…ts, ¼; to private projects (perks) at some private costs g. Hence, her utility function is U = s ¡ g (s; ¼) + w (¼; s). For simplicity, the only contracts available shall be linear in the reported pro…ts, i.e.
The owner chooses a to maximize her pro…ts (¼ ¡ s) (1 ¡ a). The manager will chose s according to her …rst-order condition.
, one obtains after some calculations for the optimal pay-performance sensitivity:
so the optimal fraction of the reported pro…ts, the manager gets is decreasing in the costs of mis-reporting. Therefore a legal reform that increases these cost will lower the fraction of pro…ts the manager appropriates. 3
Similarly, we can expect the tenure of a manager to a¤ect the pay-performance sensitivity: If a manager that stays longer with the …rm has a lower cost of diverting funds, then her pro…t-share will be larger. Because of that, both of these two e¤ects can be used to test for the incentive character of performance related pay.
The 1884 joint-stock company act as a natural experiment
To see that the 1884 reform can be viewed as a natural experiment indeed, we may shortly describe the historical and legal setting: The legislation of jointstock companies during the 19th century in Germany can be divided into three phases. 4 The …rst phase starts with the introduction of the Prussian jointstock companies act in 1838 (for railways) and 1843 (for all other companies).
According to these laws, a royal concession was necessary to found such a company and the concessioned companies were supervised by the government.
The second phase, in which the so-called "Gründerboom" of 1871-73 falls, began with a major liberalization of the legal rules concerning joint-stock companies in 1870. Founding a joint-stock company was from then on possible without royal concession and the system of state supervision was disestablished, but a two tier board system was introduced. The minimum nominal face-value of shares issued was reduced to 100 M, of which only 40 per cent had to be paid up. This popularized stock-ownership in Germany. Between 1871 and 1873 more than 900 joint-stock companies-over of 100 of them banks-were founded in Germany.
However, in a sense the liberalization went too far: there was no clearcut division of competence between executive and supervisory board (Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat); many of the new companies were unsoundly managed, and therefore the failure rate after the stock-market crash of 1873 was immense.
According to contemporaries, the defective law was the main reason for the collapse (see e.g. Glagau 1877).
Following the stock-market-crash of 1873 the laws concerning corporate governance underwent a major reform in 1884 (see for instance Ring 1890). 5 For the …rst time, the new law strictly separated the functions of the supervisory and executive board. Moreover, the minimum face value of a share was increased to 1,000 M, the shares had to be paid up in full, 6 all shareholders got a voting right, and detailed pro…t-and loss-statements had to be published.
This increased the monitoring incentives and abilities of shareholders signi…-cantly. Finally, the penalties for misbehavior of supervisory or executive board members were considerably raised.
If managerial compensation was sensitive to performance to induce the right incentives before the reform, we can expect the decline in discretionary power and the higher costs of misbehavior after the reform to lower this sensitivity.
Hence, we can use the reform as a natural experiment. 5 The importance of good corporate governance rules was already recognized by contemporary authors, e.g. Philippovich (1909, pp 186) who proposed that monitoring incentives should be strenghted by a high face value of stocks, free speech on the annual meeting of shareholders, clear accounting rules, and extensive control rights even for minority shareholders.
6 This made holding a diversi…ed portfolio rather infeasible, as the average net-national product per capita was 400 M in 1884.
Brief description of the data-set
The main source of data used for this paper is Bosenick (1912) with detailed information for nine large German joint-stock credit banks (Kreditbanken). 7 In 1910, the last year for which data are reported, these banks had total assets of nearly 7.9 billion Mark and they represented a market share of about 52 per cent of the German joint-stock credit-bank market.
Bosenick reports the pro…t shares paid to the executive-and supervisoryboard. It is important to note that these two boards were strictly separated only in 1884. Furthermore, one bank-the Schaa¤hausensche Bankverein-did not report separate pro…t shares for executive and supervisory board members until 1905. Therefore, only the total bonus payments to the supervisory and executive board members are used in the regressions. As the size of the board varies, we calculate the average bonus per member of the board. 8 In addition, we have data on the accounting pro…ts, the share price (relative to the face-value of a share), and the dividend of the nine banks. 9 Table 1 gives a summary statistics of our de ‡ated data. Table 2 presents the results, we obtain from a Maddala-Wu (1999) Fisher tests for unit-roots. 10 We can reject the hypothesis of a common unit-root both for pro…ts and the price of stocks on all usual levels of signi…cance. As the banking sector could be expected to grow for the time-period we analyze, we allow for a trend.
For the managers' bonus, our variable of most interest, however, the evidence is mixed. Formally, we cannot reject the unit-root hypothesis. Yet, this 7 Note for the referee: See appendix. 8 These information is taken from Reitmayer (1999) . 9 All data has been de ‡ated to 1913-prices using the implicit NNP de ‡ator of Ho¤mann (1965, pp 825) . In addition we also have data on the total assets and subcategories and on total lending. Yet, these items display unit-root behaviour and so are not included in any of our empirical speci…cations.
The data series start in 1871, but German accounting rules did not prescribe the publication of pro…t-loss statements until 1884. Therefore, …rst pro…t statements of the Schaa¤hausensche Bankverein are available for 1884; the Disconto Gesellschaft published …rst data in 1885. Data series for the Dresdner Bank and for the Nationalbank für Deutschland start in the year of foundation of the respective banks (1873 and 1881).
All members of the board had to be shareholders, too. However, there is no information available on how many shares each board member holds.
1 0 The test bases on an ADF-Statistics for each individual bank, allowing for variable laglength, which has been determined using a LM-Test. may well be due to a structural break in 1884 when the new laws were introduced. Hence, we estimate the direct impact of the reform on the rewards, specifying the rewards as an AR (1) with …xed bank e¤ects and a trend. Moreover, we include a dummy for the post-reform e¤ect. When we subtract the estimate of the reform-dummy from our original rewards-series, we can clearly reject the hypothesis of a unit-root at the 10% level. This result can also be interpreted as some …rst indicator of a structural break indeed taking place in 1884. Moreover, in our more structural estimations (below), the autoregressive parameter is signi…cantly smaller than one.
Empirical results
Our empirical model directly builds upon the assumption of a linear contract.
Hence, we specify
in which w it is the average bonus paid to the members of the board. ¼ it is the pro…t of …rm i at time t, x it are other individual covariates and z t denotes a vector of aggregate covariates. I is an indicator function that takes value one for the years after the reform year 1884.
In our vector of covariates x it we also include an interaction term for pro…ts and the average time the members of the board have spent on the board. This term represents the experience of the board members. We can expect the parameter for this term to be positive for two reasons: Firstly, if the board members get more experienced and build up more …rm-speci…c human capital, their in ‡uence on the banks pro…ts gets larger. Secondly, more experienced managers can be expected to divert bank resources to private projects more easily. Hence, they have to be compensated by a larger fraction of the pro…ts for not doing so.
Econometrically, two problems may complicate our analysis. The …rst one is that bonus payments are bounded by zero, so that a Tobit-model would be appropriate. However, there are not too many observations in the censored region, so that a Panel-Tobit and a random-e¤ects model do not yield substantial differences (both not reported). The other problem is the dynamic structure of our data, which we have to take into account as the unit-root hypothesis is clearly rejected. 11 If the error term is autocorrelated, i.e. u it = ½u it¡1 + » it + ½® 0i ; the estimation equation becomes
As the reform was intended to improve corporate governance structures, we expect ® 2 > 0: Moreover, we expect tenure to increase the pay-performance sensitivity.
We use the Arrellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, to estimate this equation in a …rst step. This estimator does not make use of the parameter constraints between (½; ®; µ;°). The regression results are presented in Table 3 .
1 1 Although it would be generally speaking possible to adress both the censored regression and the dynamics-problem at once, e.g. using CLAD, the sample size makes this approach infeasible. The Sargan-test cannot reject the null of overidenti…cation and so does the second-order autocorrelation-test not reject the null of no autocorrelation. So, our model seems to be well speci…ed.
The estimated parameters for the lagged independent variables are relatively close the values implied by the parameter-constraints from the AR(1)-disturbance model. Hence, we also estimate (4) using the AR(1) panel estimator of Baltagi and Wu (1999) . These estimates are reported in Table 4 .
Here, a Hausmann-test clearly rejects the random e¤ects model, so that we take the …xed-e¤ects Baltagi-Wu estimates as our most preferred ones. Yet the Arrellano-Bond estimates do not qualitatively di¤er.
An increase in pro…ts of 1000M increases the salary of the typical member of the board by 28.4M in the pre-reform period. 13 However, the 1884-reform already halved the sensitivity. Insofar, we can clearly reject the hypothesis, that the contracts in the pre-reform period were not incentive related. Moreover, we …nd the tenure-e¤ect to be also positive as predicted. Although the price of the bank's stocks enters the remuneration statistically signi…cant, economicly it seems of lesser importance as the stock price's unit of measure is percent of the nominal value of equity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a fundamental reform of the corporate governance code-the 1884 joint-stock company act in Germany-to test for incentive contracts. We …nd the pre-reform pay-performance sensitivity to be statistically signi…cant and economically important. As the reform about halved this sensitivity, we can attribute a substantial fraction of the sensitivity found to incentives. As for the post-reform period, naturally we can not exactly di¤erentiate between general-equilibrium and incentive e¤ects in the pay performance sensitivity. Yet, the large impact the reform itself has points towards a substantial incentive proportion in the sensitivity found, as the reform can be expected to not have wiped out all problems of corporate control but only a substantial fraction.
Our results may also be interpreted in another direction: Given the low payperformance sensitivity typically found in studies that use modern data, that is data from a well established system of corporate governance, inducing managers to exert e¤ort seems not to be the major problem for the principal, but rather directing this e¤ort to pro…table activities is the main point of concern.
At least our results should make cautious when interpreting increases in the pay-performance sensitivity as improvements for the shareholders. Such increases might well re ‡ect a worsening of institutions of corporate governance.
